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ABSTRACT
The aim is to describe and explain the similarities and differences between European trade 
unions concerning their views on transnational union interests and cooperation in the wake of 
the Great Recession. We do this by analyzing 221 responses from a European-wide web/postal 
survey distributed in 2015–2016 to union officials representing staff in employment sectors such 
as transport, metal and mining, construction, health care, and banking and finance. We find only 
limited sectoral differences, despite the varied impact of the Great Recession. The main findings 
are that unions in crisis-ridden southern European countries express a stronger orientation toward 
transnational union interests and cooperation. Unions in the northern and western European 
center express a weaker transnational orientation, in line with a renationalization strategy typically 
expressed in the form of national competitive corporative arrangements. This shows the impor-
tance of different institutional resources for unions across the various European industrial relations 
regimes. 
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Introduction
In this article, we analyze European trade unions’ views on transnational trade union interests and cooperation after the Great Recession, that is, the 2008 financial cri-sis and the resulting economic, employment, and sovereign debt crises in Europe. 
Following new EU governance structures, the depth of EU involvement in member states’ 
economic and social policies has increased with regard to policy aims, surveillance, and 
enforcement (de la Porte & Heins 2015; Scharpf 2013). Instead of expanding social 
investments to fight the economic crises (Bengtsson et al. 2017), austerity measures 
have been enforced, such as cuts in welfare spending and wages and deregulation of 
labor market institutions as well as implementation of policies intended to decentralize 
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collective bargaining, end legal extension of collective agreements, or restrict collective 
action. These developments add to decades of labor market institution deregulation, 
social protection system rollback, and loss of union influence and membership. 
Despite the transnational nature of the economic crises in several European 
countries – which, according to Müller and Platzer (2017, p. 289), have ‘created over-
arching, similar or complementary problems that can foster and promote joint Euro-
pean approaches’ – a possible consequence of labor market restructuring and auster-
ity policies is that unions may (even more than before) address the challenges through 
nationally bounded action. If this occurs, unions will adopt a protectionist outlook, 
and we may expect less transnational union revitalization and ‘labour-based European 
agency and identity’ (Lehndorff et al. 2017, p. 30). Thus, due to stagnant national eco-
nomic growth and weakened competitiveness, unions may approve of ‘competitive cor-
poratism’. This means that unions will accept policies of wage moderation, so-called 
‘concession bargaining’, resulting in a declining wage share in national income (Erne 
2008; Gumbrell McCormick & Hyman 2013, 2015). 
However, we expect diverse views and strategies across the various unions. They 
exist in different sectors of employment, varying in exposure to global market forces, 
and their activities are based in nation states and industrial relations regimes that are 
exposed to varying degrees of welfare retrenchment and anti-union policies. Unions 
located in countries badly hit by the Great Recession have seen deteriorating condi-
tions for bargaining and influence on a national level (see, e.g., Dølvik & Martin 2015; 
Lehndorff 2015; Lehndorff et al. 2017). As a result of weakening resources at the local 
or national level, unions may look more to the transnational, European arena for col-
lective action. This may not apply to the same degree to unions in states where the 
consequences of the Great Recession were less dramatic and the distribution of power 
resources and the capacity to act were characterized more by continuity than by change. 
But unions that are generally considered strong can also, if hit hard enough, prioritize 
local economic interests and a ‘national turn’ in union politics if they are offered gen-
erous state assistance (Bernaciak 2013). However, the question of whether this would 
entail the long-term erosion of transnational solidarity has been posed (Pernicka et al. 
2017).
Against this background, the aim of this article is to describe and explain the simi-
larities and differences between European trade unions concerning their views on trans-
national union interests and cooperation in the wake of the Great Recession. We will 
do this by analyzing responses from a European-wide survey distributed in 2015–2016 
to union officials representing staff in sectors of employment such as mining and metal, 
construction, transportation, health care, and banking and finance. 
Transnational interests and cooperation 
Although the struggle between labor and capital transcends national borders, union 
activities have traditionally taken place within the context of national industrial 
relations. When power relations between labor and capital are increasingly being relo-
cated in a spatial and temporal structure where labor is characterized as local and 
national whereas capital is coordinated globally and according to the logic of unlim-
ited capital flows, asymmetric power relations increase (cf. Bieler et al. 2014). Whereas 
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transnational and multinational companies have global strategies, for example, to 
move their facilities to countries with lower wages and less generous labor standards, 
trade unions mainly have a national focus. This is so despite the institutionalization of 
transnational/international structures of trade unionism, and despite European unions’ 
‘pronouncements on the need for international action’ (Gumbrell McCormick & 
Hyman 2013, p. 168). According to Erne (2008, p. 3), unions are ‘profoundly linked 
to the nation-state’, meaning that despite their internationalist ideology, national-level 
industrial relations and welfare arrangements have integrated them (and the working 
classes in general) ‘into their nation-states and provided them with an important set of 
rights and benefits’. Thus, the collective identities of labor organizations and their con-
stituents ‘are predominantly national or sub-national in scope; subjective conceptions of 
common interests are similarly bounded’ (Gumbrell McCormick & Hyman 2015, p. 12; 
see also Keune & Schmidt 2009, p. 19). 
But what might the specific context of economic, employment, and sovereign debt 
crises in Europe mean for unions’ views on transnational union interests and coopera-
tion? Concerning transnational interests, we will analyze union representatives’ con-
ceptions of their organizations’ common interests using diverse categories of European 
unions as well as looking at whether unions should prioritize improving conditions for 
all workers in Europe rather than focusing solely on their own members. The latter, 
stronger assertion of common transnational interests may also be viewed as capturing a 
wider conception of worker solidarity. When Gumbrell McCormick and Hyman (2015, 
p. 1) discussed the complexity of the solidarity concept, they noted that solidarity – 
understood as common interests and in relation to trade unionism – was originally based 
on perceptions of class opposition or the notion that ‘workers as a whole are victims of 
oppression and exploitation, individually weak as employees, consumers or citizens; but 
unity is strength’. This conception of workers as a whole is of relevance to the assertion 
of improving conditions for all workers in Europe. But another solidarity concept, called 
‘mutuality despite difference’, is also of great relevance here. This concept concerns 
a particular community of interest where divisions due to difference (in occupation, 
employer, sector, or nation) are transgressed. Because collective identities have tended to 
be national or subnational in character, transnational trade union solidarity – mutual-
ity despite difference of nationality among workers – must overcome national interests 
and replace them with ‘a more diffuse recognition of the human condition’ (Gumbrell 
McCormick & Hyman 2015, p. 2). 
After having discussed transnational interests, we continue our analysis with the 
topic of transnational cooperation, looking both at whether unions believe they should 
increase their efforts toward transnational cooperation within their sector/s (rather than 
cooperating with unions within other sectors in their own country) and at their thoughts 
on whether lack of transnational cooperation following the economic crisis has made 
unions in Europe more protectionist in their outlook. 
Sectoral and nation-based industrial relations regimes
One point of departure for this article is the question of whether comparative research 
on industrial relations has the most explanatory power when analyses are based on 
‘nation-based industrial relations regimes’ (cf. Visser et al. 2009), or when they are based 
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on ‘sector regimes’ (cf. Bechter et al. 2012; Howell & Givan 2011). In this article, the 
issue of transnational interests and cooperation is analyzed in relation to both national/
supranational variations and variations between employment sectors, the aim being to 
discover what significance they may have, respectively. 
Because workplaces are transnationally oriented to varying degrees, we expect to 
find differences related to employment sector. It is somewhat problematic to classify 
unions along these lines, as organizational demarcations do not simply coincide with 
employment and occupational divisions, and patterns differ across countries. Never-
theless, in our dataset, we can identify many organizations that primarily belong to 
one employment sector. Besides, a more heterogeneous category we call ‘transsectoral’, 
consisting of unions representing constituencies in several different sectors, we analyze 
responses from unions representing members in the following sectors: mining and metal, 
construction, banking and finance, and health care. 
In general terms, manufacturing is largely characterized by cross-border production 
chains and exports, whereas the service sector is less likely to be. The cross-border nature 
of the metal industry is a key factor behind the development of unions into suprana-
tional actors, because they have lost much of their influence over capital at the national 
level (Andersen 2006; Traxler et al. 2008). Andersen (2006) observed that Danish, 
Norwegian, and Swedish unions in the metal sector are more willing to engage in Euro-
pean affairs than other Scandinavian unions are. On the contrary, more nationally ori-
ented industries in private personal services and public services, such as health care, have 
been under less external pressure by production location transferability and interna-
tional competition to engage in cross-border cooperation and, thus, have less developed 
sector-based cooperation and dialogue (Bechter et al. 2012; Glassner & Pochet 2011; cf. 
Larsson 2014). On the basis of the same dataset used in this article, Vulkan and Larsson 
(2018) show that unions in the metal sector (and mining) are the ones that have been 
involved to the highest degree in seven different forms of transnational cooperation 
during the preceding 5 years. Unions in the service sectors participate in fewer forms 
of cooperation than do unions in the other sectors. This is particularly the case for 
banking and finance, whereas cooperation is somewhat higher in the health care sec-
tor (though not significantly). ‘Transsectoral unions’ and unions in the transportation 
and construction sectors are found in between those in the metal and services sectors. 
Moreover, an analysis of responses from European union representatives (collected in 
2010 and 2011) shows that unions’ transnational exchange of information on collective 
agreements takes place to a greater extent in the manufacturing sector than in sectors 
representing services and the professions (Furåker & Bengtsson 2013a). The results pre-
sented support the notion that employment sector is a crucial variable for understanding 
similarities and differences in actual transnational union cooperation. In this article, we 
will analyze whether this also seems to be the case as regards unions views’ on transna-
tional interests and cooperation.
In addition to sectoral differences, comparative research on transnational union 
cooperation has focused on differences in institutional systems between countries and 
regions in Europe. There are several industrial relations typologies, based on common-
alities between institutional arrangements and configurations (see Larsson 2015; Visser 
et al. 2009, pp. 49ff.; Van Rie et al. 2015, p. 211). This refers mainly to legal-institutional 
frameworks, collective bargaining practices (e.g., collective bargaining coverage and the 
presence of ‘multi-employer’ and ‘single-employer’ bargaining), and the relationship 
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between unions, employer organizations, and the state (e.g., union- or employer-friendly 
state policies and the existence of tripartite policy arrangements). 
It is common among institutional theory approaches to conceptualize institutional 
arrangements as both developing through a longer process and having a relatively high 
degree of stability that constitutes a causal force shaping the strategies of societal actors 
(Hall & Taylor 1996; Mahoney & Thelen 2010). Consequently, it may be difficult to 
exchange institutional arrangements that have developed over time. Once a path has 
been trodden, we are likely to be bound by habit to follow it. 
However, we should bear in mind that institutions transform both due to critical 
events, such as recessions, and due to various types of gradual change (cf. Mahoney & 
Thelen 2010). Concerning national industrial relations systems, increased global compe-
tition entails powerful pressure for liberalization (Streeck & Thelen 2005). One exam-
ple of this is the development toward more decentralized bargaining systems in many 
European countries (Marginson 2015). These kinds of developments can lead to greater 
convergence of European industrial relations. Additionally, according to Lehndorff et al. 
(2017, p. 24), after the Great Recession, the typologies of country clusters ‘make less 
sense’ as ‘the cleavages within at least part of the respective groups of countries have 
grown’. Nonetheless, in line with mainstream institutionalist approaches, we will ana-
lyze whether the institutional legacies of nation-based industrial relations regimes have 
an impact in relation to the issues examined. We will use a typology of five different cat-
egories elaborated by Visser et al. (2009); these categories are Organized corporatism, 
Social partnership, Polarized/state-centered, Liberal pluralism, and Transitional (also 
called fragmented/state-centered). 
Organized corporatism (the Nordic countries) is characterized by comprehensive 
unions and employer associations that are committed to ‘voluntary’ regulation of 
employment conditions through collective bargaining. Unions are normally the main 
representatives of employees in the workplace, collective bargaining coverage is high, 
and union density is characterized by exceptional high levels (Larsson et al. 2012; 
Gumbrell McCormick & Hyman 2013; Visser et al. 2009). Management and labor have 
a strong influence on state policy. Also, the institutional support offered by universalist 
welfare states, as well as the strong legislative support for unions, is an important power 
resource for unions (Korpi 2006).1 
Social partnership (countries in the western European center) is characterized by 
corporatist relations between the state, employer organizations, and unions, but with a 
high degree of autonomy for the social partners (Visser et al. 2009, p. 48ff.). Unions are 
divided along political and religious lines. Union density is low or moderate (although 
quite high in Belgium), but despite this, there are high levels of collective bargaining cov-
erage. Employee representation in workplaces consists of a dual system where unions 
operate alongside works councils (except in the Netherlands, where the works councils 
are the principal form of employee representation).
The Polarized/state-centered regime (the southern European countries) is charac-
terized by a significant degree of hostility between employer organizations and unions, 
which allows for state intervention and extensive regulation of employment conditions 
(Gumbrell McCormick & Hyman 2013, p. 20). Union density is low; the union move-
ment is fragmented and – as in the Social partnership regime – divided along political 
and religious lines. However, collective bargaining coverage is high, owing to the high 
degree of employer organization and legal extensions (Visser et al. 2009, pp. 49–51). 
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Employee representation at the workplace level consists of a dual system (except in 
Spain, where the main channel of employee representation is workers’ delegates and 
workers’ committees). 
The Liberal pluralism regime (the Anglophone countries) is characterized by a conflict- 
oriented relationship between capital and labor. While the state is typically noninterven-
tionist, the role of the market is vital. Thus, the power balance is clearly tilted toward 
the employer side. In the UK, the industrial relations system is described in terms of ‘vol-
untarism’, characterized by a situation in which ‘[C]ollective agreements are not legally 
binding contracts, unions are not “agents” of their members, and there are no extension 
mechanisms to generalize agreements across whole sectors’ (Gumbrell McCormick & 
Hyman 2013, p. 25). Thus, the company constitutes the principal level of bargaining, 
and collective bargaining coverage is low (Visser et al. 2009, pp. 49–51). 
The Transitional regime (the central-eastern European countries) is characterized 
by strong ‘statist’ features (Kohl & Platzer 2007). This is combined with a fragmented 
collective bargaining structure, with the company as the main level of bargaining 
and the lowest degree of bargaining coordination among the regimes discussed here 
(Visser et al. 2009, p. 51). The degree of unionization is similar to that in the Polarized/ 
state-centered regime, and many small and medium-size companies are union-free 
spheres (Kohl & Platzer 2007, pp. 617–618). ‘Business-friendly’ free-market regulations 
dominate national policy agendas. Moreover, the administration of labor law as well as 
the enforcement of employee rights is weak. 
Research on the effects of the Great Recession
In this section, we will continue by discussing the main effects of the Great Recession on 
industrial relations by presenting two country cases in each nation-based regime. Con-
cerning the Organized corporatism regime, in Sweden, the effects of the Great Reces-
sion were deep but short-lived. The rapid recovery in Sweden’s main export markets, 
stable domestic demand, aggressive interest rate cuts, and collective bargaining practices 
restricting inflation helped in bringing the recession to a close. Here, Sweden is used 
to illustrate the more general character of the Nordic countries, in that it is close to 
the ideal type of national competitive corporatism, meaning that it is wary of more 
ambitious and coordinated Europe-wide trade union measures that would challenge 
the national competitive corporative arrangements (Bengtsson & Ryner 2017; Svalund 
et al. 2013). Although similar in many respects to Sweden, Denmark suffered a budget 
crisis and the government was reluctant to contribute, causing the social partnership 
arrangement to be less pronounced after the Great Recession. Also, greater employer 
influence meant more restricted union involvement in decision-making regarding labor 
adjustments (Svalund et al. 2013).
Concerning the Social partnership regime, during the crisis, German unions made 
strong contributions to defending the competitiveness of German industry so as to save 
jobs and protect manufacturing industries (Dribbusch et al. 2017). This meant increased 
collaboration between unions and employers, where employment of the core workforce 
was prioritized through increased external flexibility, which helped buffer the crisis. But 
this also led to continued downsizing of the core workforce and outsourcing of services. 
As a result, unions demanded improvements not only for core workers but also for 
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agency workers and society as a whole. According to Dribbusch et al. (2017, p. 215), 
this has created an opportunity for unions to revive their position after decades of loss of 
union influence. In the Netherlands, the effects of the crisis on unions were limited, but 
the long-term trend of declining union density has continued, as have the slow growth 
of contractual wages and the increase in fixed-term contracts and self-employment. The 
unions have responded partly as a social partner not only to find a common approach 
to the crisis through social pacts but also to organize groups, such as precarious workers 
who have previously been ignored by the unions (de Beer & Keune 2017, pp. 241–242). 
In the Polarized/state-centered regime, the effects of the Great Recession were mas-
sive. The key priority for unions in Greece, Portugal, and Spain was ‘the defence of the 
existing system of multi-employer collective bargaining and job creation’ (Müller & 
Platzer 2017, p. 305). In Greece, the government abolished the practice of minimum 
wage negotiations at the central level between management and labor, ‘thereby elimi-
nating one of the few mechanisms through which trade unions could exert influence 
over general minimum labour standards’ (Lehndorff 2015, p. 165). This led to a huge 
cut in the statutory minimum wage, suspension of the extension of collective agree-
ments, decentralization of collective bargaining as well as to company agreements hav-
ing become the priority. In Spain, this last point has also become reality, as employer-
friendly policies have weakened the functioning and minimum standards of collective 
agreements. For instance, the Labour Reform Act of 2012 contained a new principle 
which, according to Köhler and Calleja Jiménez (2017, p. 75), gives strong incentives 
‘for employers not to renew collective agreements and instead to leave the workforce 
without protection’. This follows from the fact that the agreements end automatically 
1 year after expiration, unless the employers want to renew them. As a result, collective 
bargaining coverage decreased dramatically the years after the legislation was enacted 
(Lehndorff 2015, p. 165). 
Concerning the effects in the Liberal pluralism regime, in the UK, the Conservative 
government launched austerity measures, such as massive spending cuts in social welfare 
and the public sector. Also, anti-union policies have been installed, as the government 
has infringed on employment rights and tried to legislate for stricter rules concerning 
the right to strike. However, unions have reacted by becoming more militant, mobiliz-
ing coordinated public sector strikes and demonstrations against spending cuts, as well 
as several campaigns against austerity measures (Coderre-LaPalme & Greer 2017). In 
Ireland, the government ended social partnership arrangements with the unions in 
2008–2009 and unilaterally reduced public sector pay, legislated for a lowered min-
imum wage and deregulated collective bargaining. The unions then tried to retain a 
coordinated approach to negotiating wages, reducing or freezing wages to reduce job 
losses, and following EU inflationary targets to promote competitive business. In some 
sectors, they have managed to settle some wage increases, while elsewhere they have 
more forcefully resisted infringements on wage settlement mechanisms. Still, the unions 
have experienced growing public distrust since the Great Recession (Geary 2016).
Finally, many unions in the Transitional regime have long suffered from being frag-
mented and politicized. Thus, ‘crisis corporatism’ has become an unlikely option, as the 
impact of the Great Recession has either weakened or broken the established institutional 
exchange between management and labor, further limiting the role of the unions (Müller 
& Platzer 2017, p. 305). In Hungary, the crisis ushered in to power the national conser-
vative, right-wing political party FIDESZ. Several anti-union policies were implemented, 
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such as laws severely limiting unions’ ability to strike, and the government has actively 
dismantled many of the institutional channels of unions (Neumann & Tóth 2017). As 
a result, there has been a general decline in union density and the capacity for union 
work, both nationally and internationally. By comparison, Poland was the only country 
in the regime to avoid recession, but still unemployment increased to 14% in 2013. 
Polish union density has also experienced a long period of decline, meaning a general 
loss of union power, as unions have limited influence through collective bargaining and 
tri-partite concertation. However, according to Bernaciak (2017), the unions have had 
more success with mobilization-based initiatives, especially those centered on campaigns 
against precarious employment. Also, strikes and demonstrations have been on the rise 
since 2010, and the main unions have been successful in jointly organizing them.
Research on transnational cooperation after  
the Great Recession
In this section, we will continue by discussing the main effects of the Great Recession 
by presenting some studies on transnational cooperation in relation to each nation-
based regime. Bieler (2005, 2008) has stated that unions with major national power 
resources are less interested in European activities. Thus, we might expect that unions 
in the Organized corporatism regime would have a low preference for transnational 
cooperation. Interviews with Swedish union representatives have shown that European 
collaboration is viewed more as a threat than as an opportunity (Bieler & Lindberg 
2008, p. 212). This is attributed to the Swedish model in which the social partners are 
highly self-regulating and have good access to national policy-making (Bieler 2008, 
pp. 99–100). Other studies stress that Nordic unions are reluctant to changes toward 
supranational policies and regulations or participation in European demonstrations 
and boycotts (Furåker 2017; Furåker & Bengtsson 2013b; Furåker & Lovén Seldén 
2013; Glassner & Vandaele 2012; Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman 2013; Larsson 
2014; Vulkan & Larsson 2018). 
The previously mentioned study on preference for participation in European demon- 
strations and boycotts showed that unions in the Social Partnership regime had the high-
est level of participation in these types of transnational union collaborations (Larsson 
2014). That unions in large countries such as Germany are expected to have more posi-
tive attitudes toward transnational cooperation, at least compared to the more Euro-
sceptic Nordic unions do, follows from a point made by Traxler et al. (2008). The EMU 
is seen as a stimulus to transnational coordination of collective bargaining: There is a 
need for ‘pattern-setters’ often from large countries that are more vulnerable to com-
petitive bargaining and hence have more to gain from cross-border cooperation. Thus, 
it is claimed that Germany is ‘the centre of gravity for “inter-regional” initiatives for 
cross-border bargaining networks’ (Traxler et al. 2008, p. 222). Unions in the Social 
Partnership regime also have comparatively high expectations regarding European inte-
grationist approaches through the European Trade Union Confederation (the ETUC) 
and the European Trade Union Federations (the ETUFs) (Larsson 2015; Mitchell 2007; 
cf. Müller & Platzer 2017).
Concerning transnational union cooperation, the previously mentioned study 
of European demonstrations and boycotts showed that unions in the Polarized/
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state-centered regime, next to those in the Social Partnership regime, had the highest 
level of participation (Larsson 2014). They are also more in favor of a stronger mandate 
for supranational European union organizing (Larsson 2015).
Regarding the Liberal pluralist regime, there is research showing that, in the UK, 
union capacity for transnational cooperation is weak, and there is little sign of organiz-
ing in industry (Umney 2012). Furthermore, the ‘Brexit’ process could weaken the trans-
national interests of the unions, in that they are currently more concerned with domestic 
events (Coderre-LaPalme & Greer 2017). Like the unions in the Organized corporatism 
regime, unions in the UK tend to be more skeptical and nationally oriented with regard 
to strongly coordinated transnational union cooperation, such as transferring influence 
to organizations like the ETUC or campaigning for statutory minimum wages on a 
European level (Furåker 2017; Furåker & Bengtsson 2013a; Furåker & Lovén Seldén 
2013; Larsson 2014, 2015; Mitchell 2007).
Concerning the generally weak national position of unions in the Transitional 
regime, they are comparatively more in favor of European integrationist approaches 
to transnational union cooperation. This translates into higher expectations on the 
ETUFs and the ETUC (Larsson 2015; Mitchell 2007; cf. Müller & Platzer 2017). 
However, after the Great Recession unions have shown modest engagement in cross-
national demonstrations, boycotts, or bans, which should be seen as a result of 
both the limited tradition of contentious actions and workers’ weaker identification 
with unions in this regime (cf. Bieler & Schulten 2008; Hassel 2009; Larsson 2014; 
Vandaele 2011).
Data and key variables
The data for the following analyses were collected through a questionnaire, which 
in most cases was translated into the native language of the respondent or otherwise 
completed in English. The questionnaire was distributed in 2015–2016 to represen-
tatives of 602 unions in 36 European countries. The units of analysis are officials 
representing organizations rather than individual union members. We targeted unions 
representing staff in one or more of the following sectors: mining and metal, con-
struction, transportation, health care, and banking and finance. The intention was 
to cover sectors with broad variation in production processes, work organizations, 
and exposure to international competition (cf. Crouch 1999). The selection process 
involved approaching the total sample, with surveys sent out to all known unions in 
the above-mentioned sectors. The individuals responding for their organizations were 
leaders of their organizations (a secretary-general, president, or vice president) (66%), 
international secretaries or correspondents (17%), or persons delegated by the leaders 
to complete the questionnaire (17%). As the aim of the paper is to analyze responses 
at an organizational level, combined with the required knowledge and experience of 
the union’s transnational cooperation, these respondents were considered more suit-
able than rank-and-file members, which may have lesser knowledge of the issues here 
dealt with. 
The overall response rate was 37%, with a total of 221 cases. The response rate dif-
fered to a great extent across the various regimes: Organized corporatism (62%), Social 
partnership (39%), Polarized/state-centered (32%), Transitional (27%), and Liberal 
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pluralism (18%). To improve the response rate, we used a mixed mode survey approach 
(Fan & Yan 2010). In the first stage, a web survey was distributed to potential respon-
dents, resulting in 156 returned questionnaires. In the second stage, nonrespondents of 
the web survey were sent a hard copy of the questionnaire, resulting in the completion 
of 65 additional responses. The postal surveys particularly improved the response rate 
of unions associated with the Transitional regime. The percentage of partial respondents 
for the different variables in the survey ranges from 12% to 0.5%, which we assess to be 
within the span recommended by Newman (2014) where pairwise deletion is a reason-
able missing data treatment for construct-level missing data.
Concerning person-level missing data, the nonresponse rate is 63% for the survey 
as a whole. Missing data techniques are of limited use for dealing with person-level 
missing data to analyze the degree of nonresponse bias present in the results. This 
is especially true in our case where there are no other studies of the same nature 
that have compared the answers of respondents against nonrespondents (cf. Newman 
2014). What we can do is to report relevant information that can aid future research 
in understanding the degree of nonresponse bias potentially present in our results. 
In a large-scale review of published response rates, Anseel et al. (2010) list major 
predictors of high rates. Worth mentioning is that surveys distributed to top execu-
tive respondents have a considerable lower response rate in comparison with non-
managerial respondents. Concerning unions, it is, however, unlikely that rank-and-file 
members in general are informed about their organization’s transnational interests 
and cooperation, which poses a problem. Thus, due to the choice of respondents in 
our study, we argue that it is unavoidable to have relatively low response rates. To 
personally distribute the surveys is the strongest predictor of high response rates, but 
the nature of the survey would make that approach extremely costly and was not 
an option. Using identification numbers and showing university sponsorship of the 
survey are also predictors of high response rates, but these factors were part of the 
study design. The only predictor of high response rates that could reasonably have 
been incorporated into the study design would have been giving advance notion of 
the survey. This could be expected to have had a modest effect on the response rate 
(Anseel et al. 2010). Finally, it should be noted that the response rate for the Liberal 
pluralism regime is particularly low. The results related to this regime should thus be 
treated with specific caution. 
In this article, we primarily analyze responses to four sets of questions or state-
ments on transnational trade union cooperation. First, we analyze a question on com-
mon transnational interests: ‘To what degree does your organization have common 
interests with the following groups of trade unions within your sector in Europe?’ The 
five different groups of unions are ‘Unions in EU member states’, ‘Unions in non-EU 
member states’, ‘Unions in Euro-zone countries’, ‘Unions in countries outside the Euro-
zone’, and ‘Unions in neighboring countries’.  Second, we posed a question concern-
ing to what degree the union agreed with a number of statements. The first statement 
relevant to the issue of common transnational interests is: ‘Trade unions should give 
priority to improving the conditions of all workers in Europe instead of focusing on 
their own members’. The second and third statements related instead to the issue of 
transnational cooperation: ‘We should have more transnational trade union coopera-
tion within our sector/s rather than cooperation with unions in other sectors in our own 
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country’ and ‘The economic crisis has made trade unions in Europe more protectionist 
in their outlook’. Scores indicating the degree of support for these statements, ranging 
from To a high degree to Not at all, are presented in Tables 1 and 3. These statements 
are also analyzed using ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression with robust 
standard errors (Eicker-Hubert-White) to assess correlations with employment sector, 
nation-based industrial regimes, organization size (Tables 2 and 4), and EU and Euro-
zone membership (Table 2). All four of the statements are coded 0–3 (0 = Not at all, 
3 = To a high degree).
Following the classification of nation-based industrial relations regimes discussed 
earlier, unions were assigned, respectively, to the Organized corporatism (n = 73), Social 
partnership (n = 35), Polarized/state-centered (n = 35), Liberal pluralism (n = 9), and 
Transitional (n = 69) regimes. 
Six sectors of employment were used in the analyzes: Banking and finance (n = 22), 
Health care (n = 58), Transportation (n = 51), Construction (n = 21), Metal and mining 
(n = 30), and Transsectoral (n = 37). The two last classes differ from the original selec-
tion of sectors, and were created for pragmatic reasons. It was impossible to retain the 
distinction between metal and mining sectors, because the same unions covered these 
two sectors in many countries. Similarly, the category Transsectoral was created because 
many responding unions reported that they had members in more than one of the speci-
fied sectors and, thus, could not be assigned to a specific sector.
Regarding the variable organization size, we use this as a proxy for the unions’ 
resources, based on self-reported number of members in response to an item with the 
following seven alternatives: fewer than 5000 members (n = 63), 5000 to 9999 (n = 29), 
10,000 to 19,999 (n = 25), 20,000 to 49,999 (n = 27), 50,000 to 99,999 (n = 25), 
100,000 to 249,999 (n = 30), and 250,000 members or more (n = 21).
EU and Eurozone membership are both based on whether or not a union was a 
member in the respective arrangement in 2015.
Results
The first aspect analyzed in the Results section is whether unions believe that they have 
common interests with same-sector unions on a European level, that is, with unions in 
EU member states, in countries that are not EU members, in the Eurozone, outside the 
Eurozone, and in neighboring countries. We present the results of the degree of com-
mon interests in Table 1. Concerning unions ‘in EU member states’ and ‘in neighboring 
countries’, 64% and 68%, respectively, of the union representatives respond that they 
believe, to a high degree, that they have common interests. Concerning the statement 
‘in the Eurozone’, the number that respond to a high degree is 49%, that is, a markedly 
lower number agree. Finally, the results of the alternatives ‘in countries that are not 
EU members’ and ‘outside the Eurozone’ show a considerably lower number of repre-
sentatives who believe they have common interests to a high degree (23% and 27%, 
respectively). The most common response for these two alternatives is having common 
interests ‘to some degree’. Also, more than one-fourth of the representatives believe that 
they have common interests with these categories of unions only ‘to a low degree’ or 
‘not at all’. 
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Studying the effects of the regression analyses on the various categories of unions, 
regarding unions in EU member states (Table 2, column 1), quite a high intercept is 
observed. This indicates a generally high level of perceived common interests with this 
category of unions. Concerning size of organization, representatives of larger unions 
report more common interests than representatives of smaller unions do. Regarding sec-
toral differences, union representatives in the health care sector and transsectoral sector 
believe that they have less common interests compared to those in the transport sector 
(but notice the low statistical significance). Concerning nation-based industrial relations 
regimes, there were no statistically significant results. However, unions in the Eurozone 
report having more common interests with unions in EU member states compared to 
unions outside the Eurozone (but notice the low statistical significance).
The results for common interests with unions in non-EU countries (column 2) show 
that representatives of larger unions have more common interests compared to those of 
smaller unions. Concerning sectoral differences, representatives in the transsectoral and 
health care sectors have less in common compared to those in the transport sector. This 
seems to be the case for the banking and finance and metal and mining sectors as well (but 
notice the low statistical significance). Regarding nation-based industrial relations regimes, 
union representatives in the Liberal pluralism regime have more in common compared 
to those in the Polarized/state-centered regime (but notice the low statistical significance). 
However, when using ‘Transitional regime’ as the reference category, representatives in the 
Social Partnership regime turn out to have less in common with unions in countries that are 
not EU member states (data not shown). Also, unions in the Eurozone report more com-
mon interests than those outside the Eurozone (but notice the low statistical significance).
Studying the results for common interests with unions in the Eurozone (column 3), 
the data show that representatives of larger unions have more common interests com-
pared to those in smaller unions. There are no statistically significant results concerning 
type of sector. Regarding nation-based industrial relations regimes, it turns out that 
representatives in the Organized corporatism regime have less in common with unions 
in the Eurozone compared to those of the Polarized/state-centered regime (but notice the 
low statistical significance). This is an expression of the fact that four of the five coun-
tries in the Organized corporatism regime are nonmembers of the Eurozone. Moreover, 
the findings reveal a somewhat surprising outcome, namely that union representatives in 
countries outside the EU believe they have more in common with unions in the Eurozone 
than union representatives active in the EU do. 
Table 1  Extent that trade unions have common interests with the following groups of trade unions 
within the sector. Percent




To a low 
degree
Not at all Total
In EU member states 64.3 31.5 1.9 2.4 100 (n = 213)
In countries that are not EU 
members
22.9 49.8 21.5 5.9 100 (n = 205)
In the Eurozone 48.8 38.9 8.9 3.5 100 (n = 203)
Outside the Eurozone 27.3 44.3 22.2 6.2 100 (n = 194)
In neighboring countries 68.3 25.5 5.3 1 100 (n = 208)
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Table 2  Trade union’s degree of common interests with other categories of trade unions  
in Europe 
















Metal and mining –0.16 –0.40+ 0.04 –0.21 –0.25
Construction –0.07 –0.26 0.08 –0.10 –0.07
Health care –0.24+ –0.50** –0.25 –0.32 –0.09
Banking and finance –0.05 –0.46+ –0.15 –0.42 –0.27




Organized corporatism –0.17 0.38 –0.40+ 0.41 0.15
Social partnership 0.00 –0.27 –0.20 –0.24 0.16
Liberal pluralism 0.25 0.45+ –0.38 0.49 0.09
Transitional 0.04 0.23 –0.23 0.31 0.05
EU membership
Member state (ref.)
Nonmember state 0.14 0.17 0.27+ 0.16 0.13
Eurozone membership 
In the Eurozone (ref.)
Outside the Eurozone –0.33+ –0.31+ –0.11 –0.47* 0.11
Size 0.09** 0.11** 0.011*** 0.13** 0.03
Intercept 3.41 2.72 3.28 2.58 3.50
N 208 200 198 190 203
R2 adj. 0.037 0.055 0.013 0.067 0.000
Results of OLS regression analysis: Unstandardized b-coefficients.
Levels of significance: +p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Concerning the results for common interests with unions outside the Eurozone 
(column 4), we can, once again, see that representatives of larger unions agree more 
with the statement than do those of smaller unions. There are no statistically significant 
results for type of sector. Regarding nation-based industrial relations regimes, with the 
Polarized/state-centered regime as a reference category, there are no statistically signifi-
cant effects. However, when the reference category is changed to ‘Transitional regime’, 
union representatives in the Social Partnership regime turn out to have less in common 
with this category of trade unions (data not shown). Moreover, union representatives in 
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the Eurozone report more common interests than do those outside the Eurozone. Finally, 
the results for common interests with unions in neighboring countries (column 5) show 
quite a high intercept, indicating a generally high level of common interests. Following 
this, there are no statistically significance effects for the variables analyzed. 
To sum up, the first set of statements regarding whether union representatives have 
common interests with unions within the union’s sector in Europe show, first, some sec-
toral differences. Union representatives in the transport sector believe they have a stron-
ger degree of common interests with unions on a transnational level than representatives 
in the health care sector do. One probable explanation is that the transport sector is more 
heavily subject to international competition than is the health care sector, as the latter is 
often organized and funded by public authorities (cf. Furåker 2017). Another tendency 
is that, in comparison with representatives in the transport sector, union representatives 
in the metal and mining, health care, banking and finance, and transsectoral sectors 
agree less with the statement that they have common interests with unions in non-EU 
member states. Second, size generally matters, meaning that representatives of larger 
unions see more common interests than representatives of smaller unions do. Third, we 
find few statistically significant results concerning the effects of nation-based industrial 
relations regimes. But there are three interesting findings. In comparison with representa-
tives in the Polarized/state-centered regime, those in the Liberal pluralism regime believe 
they have more in common with unions in non-EU member states. Also, in comparison 
with representatives in the Social partnership regime, those in the Transitional regime 
express more common interests with unions in countries that are ‘not EU member states’ 
and unions ‘outside the Eurozone’, which is the situation for many of these unions. 
Finally, union representatives in the Organized corporatism regime believe they have less 
in common with unions in the Eurozone compared to representatives in the Polarized/
state-centered regime. Fourth, the factor of Eurozone membership has some explanatory 
value, as unions within the Eurozone seem to have more common interests with different 
categories of European unions than do unions in countries outside the Eurozone. 
Besides this, what we earlier described as a stronger assertion of common transna-
tional interests and a wider conception of worker solidarity is analyzed: whether unions 
‘should give priority to improving the conditions of all workers in Europe instead of 
focusing on their own members’. We see the response pattern in Table 3. The results 
show that 25% agree to a high degree, 41% to some degree, while 33% have responded 
‘a low degree’ or ‘not at all’. Thus, the responses show that there is a great deal of varia-
tion among union representatives around Europe. 
We continue by analyzing results from the statement on worker solidarity using 
regression analyses. There are no statistically significant effects for organization size for 
this statement or the two other statements analyzed below. This is in contrast to the find-
ings showing clear differences in common interests with other categories of European 
unions found between smaller and larger unions (see Table 2). 
Continuing to the statement on worker solidarity, the results presented in Table 4 
(column 1) show that union representatives in the mining and metal, construction, and 
banking and finance (but notice the low level of statistical significance) sectors agree 
to a higher extent with the statement compared to representatives in the transport and 
the health care sector. Health care is typically a part of public welfare state services and 
does not usually experience any serious foreign competition. Thus, in comparison with 
unions in sectors subject to stronger international competition, unions in the health care 
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sector may see little incentive to improve the conditions for European workers overall. 
Additionally, in the wake of the Great Recession, health services in many countries have 
been exposed to austerity measures that may have forced a more protectionist orienta-
tion. But why do we find that representatives in the transport sector also downplay 
transnational worker solidarity? Their viewpoints can be seen as an expression of the 
tough competition companies in the sector face from other countries (see, e.g., Bechter 
et al. 2012; Erne 2008). This fierce competition may have increased following the Great 
Recession, with low economic growth and mass unemployment in many European 
economies. A situation such as this would make it difficult for these types of unions not 
to focus on their own members at the national level. 
What are the effects of unions being situated in nation-based regimes? Union rep-
resentatives in the Organized corporatism, Liberal pluralism, and Social partnership 
regimes agree to a lesser extent with the statement than do those in the Polarized/state-
centered regime. Particularly, the results from the Liberal pluralism regime should be 
treated with caution due to the very low response rate among union representatives in 
this regime. Moreover, there are no discernable differences between the responses of 
representatives in the Polarized/state-centered regime and those of representatives in the 
Transitional regime. 
Continuing to the first aspect of transnational union cooperation, we analyze 
whether there should be more transnational cooperation on the sectoral level rather 
than cooperation with other unions in the home country. About one-third of the union 
representatives agree to a high degree (Table 3). Adding also those that agree to some 
degree, this is the case for three-fourths of all respondents. Continuing to the regres-
sion analyzes, there is no statistically significant effect of sector (Table 4, column 2). 
Concerning nation-based industrial relations regimes, representatives in the Organized 
Corporatism and Social Partnership regimes agree to a lesser extent about increasing 
efforts to establish this form of transnational cooperation in comparison with those in 
the Polarized/state-centered regime. This also means that there are no statistically signifi-
cant effects between unions in the Liberalism pluralism and Transitional regimes and the 
Table 3  Union representatives’ preferences and perceptions concerning three statements on  
transnational interests and cooperation. Percent




To a low 
degree
Not at all Total
Trade unions should prioritize to 
improve the conditions for all work-
ers in Europe rather than focusing 
on solely their own members.
25.4 41.3 25.8 7.5 100 (n = 213)
We should have more transnational 
trade union cooperation within our 
sector/s rather than cooperating 
with trade unions within other sec-
tors in our own country. 
34 41 19.3 5.7 100 (n = 212)
The economic crisis has made trade 
unions in Europe more protectionist 
in their outlook.
18 53.3 22.6 6.2 100 (n = 195)
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Table 4  Union representatives’ preferences and perceptions concerning three statements on  











crisis has made 




Metal and Mining 0.44* 0.10 –0.13
Construction 0.57** 0.09 –0.09
Health care –0.04 –0.25 –0.15
Banking and finance 0.40+ 0.02 –0.11
Transsectoral 0.25 -0.07 –0.18
Regime
Polarized/state-centered (ref.)
Organized corporatism –0.88*** –0.65*** –0.52**
Social partnership –0.44* –0.62** –0.66**
Liberal pluralism –0.74** –0.11 –0.30
Transitional –0.20 –0.19 –0.08
Size –0.03 –0.04 0.02
Intercept 2.21 2.59 2.12
N        208 207       191
R2 adj. 0.194 0.097 .082
OLS regression analysis: Unstandardized b-coefficients.
Levels of significance: +p< 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
representatives in the Polarized/state-centered regime. One potential factor explaining 
the different views on the need for transnational cooperation between unions in south-
ern Europe and the Transitional regime, on the one hand, and unions in the western 
and northern European center, on the other hand, is the extent to which unions have 
been collaborators in enforcing ‘competitive corporatism’ to boost national competitive-
ness (cf. Erne 2008). Support for this is found in an additional analysis of responses to 
another statement in the dataset, which shows that union representatives in the Tran-
sitional regime believe that ‘transnational union cooperation is needed to avoid certain 
countries getting competitive advantages over others’ (data not shown). 
Continuing to another aspect that we can interpret as perceived lack of transna-
tional trade union cooperation, the results show that many union representatives agree, 
at least to a certain extent, with the statement that the economic crisis has made unions 
more protectionist in their outlook: 18% agree to a high degree and 53% to some degree 
(see Table 3). Thus, if the perception exists among union representatives that many unions 
have become more protectionist, it is easier to understand that many would like to have 
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increased transnational union cooperation within their sector/s rather than cooperating 
with nationally based unions, as seen in the former statement that was analyzed. 
Continuing to the regression analyzes on whether the economic crisis has made 
unions more protectionist in their outlook, the results do not show any statistically 
significant effects of type of sector (see Table 4, column 3). Concerning nation-based 
industrial relations regimes, union representatives in the Organized corporatism and 
Social partnership regimes agree to a lesser extent with the statement compared to those 
in the Polarized/state-centered regime. The effects are once again fairly clear, showing a 
high level of statistical significance. 
To sum up, our analyses have shown that union representatives’ preferences 
and perceptions concerning transnational interests and cooperation differ markedly 
between unions in countries of the western and northern European center and those in 
the southern and central/eastern parts of Europe. This means that not only do unions in 
the Organized corporatism and Social partnership regimes agree to a lesser extent with 
statements on increased European worker solidarity and transnational sector coopera-
tion, but also that this seems to follow from the fact that they also believe to a lesser 
extent that, after the Great Recession, unions have become more protectionist in their 
outlook. 
Conclusion
In this article, we have analyzed union representatives’ views on transnational union 
interests and cooperation in the wake of the Great Recession. If we look at the effects 
of the nation-based industrial relations regimes, representatives in the Polarized/state-
centered regime express a stronger orientation toward transnational union interests and 
cooperation. In this regime, we find the countries that were generally hit hardest by the 
economic crisis in the form of continuing austerity, mass unemployment, and the sover-
eign debt crises. The effects on workers and unions were severe following deregulation 
and anti-union policies. Thus, the conditions for unions to bargain and have influence at 
the national level have worsened. The official lenders – the ‘troika’ who negotiated the 
conditions for aid to particularly hard-hit crisis countries – demanded extensive struc-
tural reforms, such as reduced employment security or reduced minimum wages, unem-
ployment benefits, and pensions. The anti-union policies simultaneously implemented by 
national governments had enormous consequences for union power and influence in coun-
tries such as Greece and Spain. Among other things, Greek unions experienced abolish- 
ment of minimum wage negotiations at the central level between unions and employer 
organizations, suspension of the extension procedure of collective agreements, and decen-
tralization of collective bargaining. In Spain, following several labor reforms, the func-
tioning and minimum standards of collective agreements have weakened considerably 
and, as a result, collective bargaining coverage decreased dramatically (see, e.g., Köhler 
& Calleja Jiménez 2017; Lehndorff 2015; Marginson 2015; Müller & Platzer 2017). 
As emphasized by Müller and Platzer (2017, p. 289), in contrast to countries in 
southern Europe and some countries in the Transitional regime, ‘countries of the western 
and northern European centre could moderate the effects of the crisis’. This means 
that the effects of the Great Recession have created nation-specific (or regime-specific) 
structural and institutional contexts and ‘at the same time divergent problems and 
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contexts for trade union action, which make it more difficult for trade unions in Europe 
to develop common, coherent and transnationally coordinated strategies’ (Müller & 
Platzer 2017, p. 289). Before the Great Recession unions in the Organized corpora- 
tism and Social Partnership regimes had already adopted what Erne (2008, p. 24) called 
‘a technocratic renationalization strategy’, downplaying the traditional class conflict 
between the interests of labor and capital for the benefit of ‘monistic alliances to boost 
national competitiveness’ by constraining wage growth. This renationalization strategy 
is typically expressed in the form of ‘competitive corporatist arrangements’, such as 
social pacts at the national level (Erne 2008, p. 187). By using Sweden as a case that, in 
the words of Bengtsson and Ryner (2017, p. 277), ‘conforms quite well with the ideal 
type of a nationally oriented competitive corporatism’, the authors describe how power-
ful unions, in the aftermath of the so-called Nordic banking crisis in the early 1990s, 
retreated from the critique of neoliberal monetary policy, while they accepted competi-
tive corporatism. This order was reproduced during and after the Great Recession, for 
example, seen in moderate wage pressures. 
Moreover, the strategy of social partners acting as wage moderators is of great interest 
to European public authorities, who see rising labor costs as a key concern. Since the onset 
of the Great Recession, these authorities have increasingly demanded reforms of national 
wage-setting institutions through the EU semester system. As a result, commentators such 
as the ETUC have stated that the country-specific recommendations from the European 
Commission have ‘trespassed on social partner autonomy’ (Prosser 2016, p. 465). 
To conclude, the renationalization strategy seems to have effected, among other 
things, unions’ views on transnational union interests and cooperation. Especially union 
representatives in the Social partnership and Organized corporatism regimes express a 
weaker transnational orientation in response to the statements analyzed in this article. 
Returning to the Swedish case, the competitive corporatist logic, combined with factors 
such as the worker movement’s nationally oriented welfare state discourse, seems to be 
impedimental to a more overarching European agency.
But we should not interpret trade union representatives’ divergent views solely as 
outcomes of European countries having drifted apart economically and socially after the 
Great Recession. Eurozone membership seems to have some explanatory value as well. 
Unions within the Eurozone seem to have more common interests with different catego-
ries of European unions than with unions in countries outside the Eurozone. Concerning 
unions in the Organized corporatism regime, the results showing a weaker transnational 
orientation are consistent with findings from earlier research on Euro-skepticism among 
Nordic trade unions (see, e.g., Furåker & Bengtsson 2013; Glassner & Vandaele 2012). 
This skepticism is due to, among other things, great differences in social and economic 
standards between European countries, and it is also an expression of a strategy to 
conserve the Nordic model of labor relations. Moreover, union representatives in the 
western and northern European center conceive of the issue of unions having developed 
a more protectionist outlook quite differently (i.e., they agree to a lesser extent with the 
statement) from representatives in the southern and eastern parts of Europe. This find-
ing can be interpreted as providing another example of the contemporary cleavage, or 
divergence in experiences, between trade unionists in Europe. 
We end this article with another main finding. When posing questions about how 
widespread different forms of transnational cooperation are (or have been during the 
past few years), researchers have often found that sectoral differences seem to be more 
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important than national contexts. For example, Vulkan and Larsson (2018) show that 
employment sector explains more of the level of engagement in different forms of 
transnational union cooperation (during the preceding 5 years) than does nation-based 
industrial relations regimes. In the present study, it is somewhat surprising that, in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession, we do not find more clear-cut sectoral differences. In 
other words, we might have expected different sectors to have been effected to various 
degrees by the recession, thus causing union representatives to have responded in more 
diverse ways to the statements. Instead, what we found is that when representatives of 
European unions take a stand on how issues should be (e.g., to improve the conditions 
of European workers overall or to have more transnational cooperation within the sec-
tor), nation-based industrial relations regimes explain more than employment sector and 
organization size. Thus, following the critical events of the Great Recession, the depth 
of institutional transformation of industrial relations and welfare state systems seems 
to have varied with different nation-based industrial relations regimes. Because ‘the 
national areas of conflict for trade unions are drifting apart’ (Lehndorff 2015, p. 158), 
researchers still need to stress the importance of the different institutional resources 
for trade unions across the various European industrial relations regimes if they are to 
understand the future prospects for European collective action on the part of labor. 
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Note
1  However, there are signs of possible change in the Organized corporatism regime. Although it is 
unlikely that we will see an outright attack on trade union rights in the Nordic countries, demands 
to restrict collective action have been made in the past decade, and less favorable terms for union 
membership have been implemented (see, e.g., Bergholm & Bieler 2013; Kjellberg 2011). 
